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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988), * 78-2-2 (1989), and 
Rule 14(a), Rules of Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This petition for review is from a Final Decision of 
the Utah State Tax Commission on March 22, 1989, in favor of the 
Audit Division of the Tax Commission ("Tax Commission" or 
"Commission") sustaining the proposed assessment of a fraud 
penalty against Dennis Silver ("Petitioner" or "Silver"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
case: 
1. Whether the Tax Commission has properly inter-
preted and applied the fraudulent intent to evade tax provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92 (1986 supplement), since: 
(a) No tax was due from Silver and he was enti-
tled to refunds for over collected tax in each year. 
(b) The elements of fraudulent intent to evade 
tax or other legal duty were not established by the evidence or 
found by the Tax Commission hearing officer. 
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(c) The facts found and evidence presented are 
inconsistent with the conclusions reached. 
2. Whether the Tax Commission met and carried its 
burden of proof pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 59-14A-94 (1986 
Supplement) (Addendum II), to establish that Mr. Silver has been 
guilty of fraud with intent to evade tax since: 
(a) There were no factual findings of fraudulent 
acts or evidence in the record to support a charge of fraud. 
(b) The conclusions reached are inconsistent with 
the evidence presented and the factual findings. 
3. Whether the Commission properly assessed the 
proposed penalty and filed tax warrants under the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-14A-79 (1986 Supplement), renumbered 
59-10-528 (1987), which have become a lien on Silver's property 
prior to the final determination of petlitioner' s liability in 
these proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. Nature of Case. 
Mr. Silver did not file Federal or State income tax 
returns for the years 1977 through 1983 in the belief that he was 
not required to file due to his low incomq and there being no tax 
due. (R55, 57, 218) 
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The Utah State Tax Commission contacted Silver and 
required him to file tax returns for these years. (R148, 218) 
Mr. Silver filed the tax returns. All returns filed reflected 
refunds due Silver. (R64) 
The Commission subsequently proposed penalties of $50 
per return for failure to file pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-14A-92Q) (1986 Supplement) (negligence penalties) and $1000 
per return for fraudulent "intent to evade tax" pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 59-14A-92(5) (1986 Supplement) (fraud penalties). 
(R41, 146) 
Mr. Silver contested the proposed assessments at 
informal and formal hearings before the Tax Commission. 
2. Course of Proceedings. 
On or around November 1, 1986 Mr. Silver received a 
notice that the Tax Commission was proposing penalty assessments 
against him. On November 17, 1986 a request for waiver or 
abatement of the proposed penalties was filed with the Commis-
sion. On March 16, 1987 Mr. Silver was notified his request for 
waiver was under consideration. On or around April 24, 1987 Mr. 
Silver was notified that the requested waiver had been denied. 
(R69) On May 22, 1987 Mr. Silver filed a petition for an infor-
mal hearing before the Tax Commission. (R52-66) On November 3, 
1987 an informal hearing was held. The Commission entered an 
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informal decision on December 29, 1987, upholding the proposed 
assessments. (R36-40) 
On January 20, 1988 an appeal from the informal deci-
sion and request for formal hearing was filed by Silver with the 
Tax Commission. (R20-24) The formal hearing was held on Decem-
ber 10, 1988 and a final decision was rendered on March 22, 1989 
upholding the proposed assessments. (R15-19) 
A petition for review was filed with the Supreme Court 
on April 12, 1989. (R8) 
On or around April 22, 1989 Mr. Silver filed for 
protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act and the auto-
matic stay went into effect staying further proceedings before 
the Supreme Court. 
On February 28, 1990 an order was entered by the 
Bankruptcy Court lifting the stay and directing that—Silver' s 
appeal proceed before the Utah Courts. (R2-4) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dennis Silver did not file Federal or State income tax 
returns for the years 1972 to 1983 in thel belief that he did not 
I 
meet the minimum filing requirements. (ft55, 56, 57, 218) From 
1972 to 1976 he was a student and did not have taxable income. 
From 1976 to 1983 Silver was a self-employed radio technician and 
worked part time for various radio stations. During this period, 
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Silver determined that his income was below the filing require-
ment threshold of Utah Code Ann. $ 59-14A-48 (1973) (Addendum IV) 
and that he owed no tax because of income tax withheld from his 
salary. He believed that he was not required under these circum-
stances to file an income tax return. (R218-219) 
On or around August 16, 1984 a letter was sent to 
Silver from the Tax Commission regarding the status of the tax 
returns for years 1972 to 1983. (R148) 
Mr. Silver contacted the Commission and discussed his 
situation with Mr. Kenneth Rodall. It was agreed between Silver 
and Mr. Rodall that income tax returns for 1972 through 1976 were 
not required. However, Mr. Rodall insisted that returns for 1977 
to 1983 be prepared and filed. Silver agreed to file the 
requested returns. (R 219f 220) 
Dennis Silver, upon beginning work to assemble the 
requested returns, determined that the work was beyond his 
ability. (R220-221) He determined that he was unable to prepare 
the returns himself so he requested assistance and information 
from the Commission, hired a bookkeeper in late 1984, and 
retained the services of a CPA in approximately April 1985. 
(R221-222) The CPA advised Silver of the records he would need 
to assemble for the CPA to complete the tax returns. Mr. Silver, 
due to his financial condition, decided to assemble the records 
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himself rather than having the CPA do the work for him because of 
the cost. (R222) 
While Silver was working on assembling the information 
he was not contacted by the Tax Commission. On or around August 
14, 1985, without prior notice, petitiobor was served with a 
notice to appear at a Writ of Mandate hearing. (R223) Mr. 
Silver contacted the Commission but was told to contact the 
attorney general's office. (R151, 223). He contacted the attor-
ney general's office and explained to the attorney in charge that 
he was in the process of preparing returns. Based upon Silver's 
conversation with the attorney general's office, he stipulated to 
entry of the Writ of Mandate against him and he understood that 
he would not need to appear at the Writ of Mandate hearing. 
(R168, 224) 
When the Writ of Mandate was issued it provided that 
returns would be filed within 30 days. Mr. Silver notified the 
attorney general's office that he would be unable to complete the 
returns within 30 days. (R224) Silver was given an extension, 
but when Silver was unable to have returns completed by the due 
date set by the attorney general's office an order to show cause 
hearing was scheduled for March 24, 1986. At that hearing, the 
court set a deadline of April 25, 1986 for the filing of the 
returns. (R114). All returns, with the exception of the 1981 
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return which was filed later, were filed before the April 25 
deadline. Every return reflected a refund due Silver. (R56-57). 
In spite of this fact, the Tax Commission notified Silver in 
November of 1986 that they were proposing assessment of the 
negligence penalty of $50.00 per return and a fraud penalty of 
$1000.00 per return. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1#, In applying and construing tax statutes, statutes 
imposing taxes and prescribing tax procedures should generally be 
construed favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the 
taxing authority. The purpose of a statute is to be gathered 
from the whole act. In determining such purpose, resort may be 
had not only to the context but to the structure and scheme of 
the act. The statute is to be read and construed in its 
entirety. 
2. The Tax Commission has not properly interpreted or 
applied the penalty statute in this case, they have not presented 
evidence of a fraudulent intent. The burden of proof to estab-
lish fraudulent intent to evade tax is upon the Tax Commission, 
and they have not carried their burden of proof to establish that 
petitioner had fraudulent intent to evade taxes. The Commission 
has failed to adequately investigate the facts of this case and 
has subjected Dennis Silver to the fraud penalty without evidence 
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to support their proposed assessment and jclaim. The Commission 
has failed to apply statutory standards and judicial guidelines 
in the determination of what constitutes "fraud" and "intent to 
evade". As a result of the Commission's acts Silver has been 
damaged. He has sustained substantial costs in defending himself 
and has been forced into bankruptcy in order to preserve his 
rights to appeal this case to the courts. The Tax Commission has 
also filed liens against Silver's property prior to obtaining a 
final determination of the tax liability, contrary to the statu-
tory procedures of the Utah Code. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COMMISSION HAS MISINTERPRETED AND MISAP-
PLIED THE PENALTY STATUTE IN THIS CASE. 
A, Rules of Statutory Construction and Interpretation 
Provide that Statutes Be Construed Based Upon the Entire Statute 
Not Any One Part. 
The general rules of statutory construction provided 
that the purpose of a statute is to be fathered from the whole 
statute or act. In determining the purpose the courts will look 
to not only the context but to the structure and scheme of the 
act and in some cases its historical background and subsequent 
amendment. 
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The statute in issue is Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92 
(1987 Supplement) (Addendum I) which when read in its entirety 
and understood as a whole discloses a legislature intent to 
create a penalty structure which provides for a negligence 
penalty, a civil fraud penalty and a criminal fraud penalty. 
In applying and construing tax statutes, this court has 
said, that statutes imposing taxes and prescribing tax procedures 
should generally be construed favorably to the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority. (Bu ilde rs Componen t 
Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97 at 99 (1969). 
B. Statutory Definitions and Case Law Have Provided 
Standards in Determining What Conduct Constitutes "Fraudulent 
Intent to Evade Tax", These Standards Were not Applied in This 
Case. 
The phrase "fraudulent intent to evade tax" Jaas been 
interpreted to mean conduct on the part of the taxpayer which is 
designed to mislead or conceal the true facts of an individual 
tax liability with the specific intent that tax due be evaded. 
Such conduct must be willful, and with the knowledge of the legal 
duty. Fraud is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: 
A false representation of a matter of fact 
whether by words or by conduct, by false or 
misleading allegations, or by concealment of 
that which should have been disclosed, which 
deceives and is intended to deceive another 
so that he shall act upon it to his legal 
injury. 
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The Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103 (1974) defines intent as follows: 
Definition of "intentionally, or with intent 
or willful"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal 
negligence" or criminally negligent". 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or will-
fully or with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or to cause the result; 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct for the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
The Utah Code at Section 76-2-101 (1983) provides in pertinent 
part: 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his 
conduct is prohibited by law and; 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with 
a mental state otherwise specified in the 
statute defining the offense, as the defini-
tion of the offence requires. . . . 
There are no Utah cases dealing with the interpretation 
of penalty statute 59-14A-92 (1986 Supplement). However, where 
there is no Utah law, the Tax Code provides at Section 
59-10-103(2) (1989): 
Any term used in this chapter has the same 
meaning as when used in comparable context in 
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the laws of the United States relating to 
federal income taxes unless a different 
meaning is clearly required. Any reference 
to the Internal Revenue Code or the law of 
the United States shall mean the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 as amended, or other 
provisions of the laws of the United States 
relating to the federal income taxes which 
are in effect for the taxable year. . . . 
Thus in interpreting and determining the standard to be 
used we may look to Federal law. Numerous Federal cases have 
dealt with and defined what constitutes "fraudulent intent to 
evade taxes". In the case of Michael Pavlic v. The Commissioner, 
47 T.C.M. 1491 (1984) (T.C. Memo 1984-182 Dec. 41,129(M)), the 
U.S. Tax Court said: 
The existence of fraud is a fact which 
must be determined on the basis of all the 
facts and circumstances. 
Fraud means "actual, intentional wrong-
doing, and the intent required is the spe-
cific purpose to evade a tax believed to be 
owing;" fraud is not to be imputed or pre-
sumed, and the mere failure to report income 
is not sufficient to establish fraud. The 
taxpayer's entire course of conduct may be 
examined. (Citations omitted.) 
This Court went on to say: 
The United States Supreme Court has recently 
said that willfulness (for tax purposes) is 
"a voluntary intentional violation of a known 
legal duty." This and other courts have held 
that willfulness as used in the context of 
tax crime includes those elements necessary 
to sustain civil fraud. 
-11-
In this case the taxpayer refused to file tax returns 
for 1975 to 1979 as a protest to government funding of abortions. 
In addition to failing to file tax returns, the taxpayer filed 
false forms W-4. The Court sustained the fraud penalty because 
the taxpayer admitted he knew he had a legal duty to file and he 
undertook to hide his conduct by filing false W-4 forms. 
The elements of "fraudulent intent to evade tax," are 
(1) a tax due and (2) a part of the deficiency being due to 
fraud. A misunderstanding of law or a duty, will not support the 
specific intent required. 
In the case of Marvin G. Palmer v. The Commissioner,, 53 
T.C.M. 633 (1987) (T.C. Memo 1987-204 Dec. 43,858(M)), the U.S. 
Tax Court said: 
Respondent bears the burden of proving fraud 
by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent 
must show that petitioner intended to evade 
taxes which he knew or believed that he owed 
by conduct intending to conceal, mislead or 
otherwise prevent the collection of the 
taxes. The elements to be established are: 
(1) an underpayment of tax and (2) that some 
part of this underpayment was due to fraud. 
The existence of fraud is a factual question 
to be determined by an examination of the 
entire record. Fraud will never be presumed. 
Fraud may however be proved by circumstantial 
evidence because direct proof of taxpayer's 
intent is rarely available, and taxpayer's 
entire course of conduct may establish the 
requisite fraudulent intent. 
However, fraud is never imputed or presumed 
and courts should not sustain findings of 
fraud upon the circumstances that, at most, 
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create only a suspicion. Even a strong 
suspicion is not sufficient to show fraud, 
but fraud must be established by evidence 
that is clear and convincing. (citations 
omitted). 
In this case, the Internal Revenue Service's assertion 
of the fraud penalty was not sustained where the taxpayer pre-
sented evidence of an honest misunderstanding of the law. 
The taxpayer had taken deductions related to an oil and 
gas investment, which were later shown to be improper. The Court 
found that the legal issues at the time were unsettled and the 
taxpayer had relied on the advice of his accountant. 
The case of Cirillo v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 478 1963) 
(11 A.F.T.R. 2d 910) (Addendum III) is very similar to our case. 
In this case the taxpayer, an attorney, filed his 1945 through 
1954 income tax returns after being contacted by the government 
in 1957. The Commissioner asserted a fraud penalty^-and the 
taxpayer appealed. 
At his trial, the taxpayer testified that he had failed 
to file timely returns not because of any intent to defraud, but 
because he believed on the basis of a summary mental calculation 
made at the end of each year, that income tax withheld from his 
salary was enough to cover all income taxes payable on his salary 
and the small amount of net income from self employment in his 
private practice. 
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The taxpayer conceded that he kept no systematic 
records of receipts and expenditures in the case of his law 
practice and made no detailed computation of his tax liability at 
the end of each tax year. He relied on his subsequently filed 
income tax returns to show his good faith. His income tax 
returns showed that for the years 1945 through 1951 he was 
entitled to refunds. For the years 1952 through 1954 there was a 
small amount of tax due. The court said: 
The evidence in this case strongly 
indicates that the taxpayer's failure to file 
returns was willful neglect of a statutory 
duty. As a lawyer he must have been aware 
that one who earns several thousand dollars a 
year is obligated to file income tax returns. 
Each year he was reminded of his duty to file 
a return by the standard W-2 Form which he 
received from his employer. . . . 
But willful failure to file a timely 
return, which may create both criminal 
liability and an additional civil liability, 
does not in itself and without more estab-
lished liability for a fraud penalty, though 
it may be relevant in that connection. Jones 
v. Commissioner, 5th Cir. 1958, 259 F.2d 300 
(2 Aftr. 2d 5 7 3 6 ) . . . . 
The Court went on to say: 
This is true because a fraud penalty can be 
imposed only where proof of deficiency is 
supplemented by proof that the deficiency is 
due to fraud with intent to evade tax. . . . 
To justify a fraud penalty the circumstances 
surrounding the failure to file returns must 
strongly and unequivocally indicate an 
intention to avoid the payment of 
L a x e s . . . . 
-14-
Taxpayer contends that his willful 
failure to file was not and could not have 
been the result of a scheme to cheat the 
government out of taxes which he was obli-
gated to payr because he did not believe that 
he owed any taxes. We are aware that the tax 
court disbelieved this testimony and that it 
is not for this Appellate Court to assess 
taxpayer's credibility as a witness. How-
ever , the Commissioner's heavy burden of 
proof on the issue of fraud cannot be satis-
fied by mere disbelief of taxpayer's testi-
mony. The record must contain some convinc-
ing affirmative indication of the required 
specific intent. 
The court held that for the years that no tax was due a 
fraud penalty was not applicable. 
C. The Statutory Requirement of Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-14A-92 Requires that Fraudulent "Intent to Evade" be Present 
in Order to Sustain the Fraud Penalty. 
The statute sets out two types of penalties, a negli-
gence penalty and a fraud penalty. Section (1) provides a $50 
negligence penalty for failure to file a return if such failure 
is without fraudulent intent. The second part of the penalty 
statute applies a civil/criminal fraud penalty ranging from 
$1,000 to $25,000 to persons who knowingly and intentionally with 
fraudulent intent to evade tax, fail to pay a tax due or file a 
false or fraudulent return or supply false information. 
(R144,145, 146) 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92 titled "Civil and Criminal 
Penalties-Limitation of Prosecution" states: 
(1) Every person who, without fraudulent 
intent, fails to make, render, sign or verify 
any return, or to supply any information 
within the time required by or under the 
provisions of this chapter, is liable to a 
penalty of $50 to be imposed, assessed and 
collected by the Tax Commission in the same 
manner as is provided by this chapter with 
regard to delinquent taxes. This $50 penalty 
does not apply to returns disclosing a refund 
until ninety (90) days after the date the 
return is due. After ninety (90) days the 
penalty shall be half the refund or $50 
dollars, which ever is less. If a refund 
return is filed and the gross income reported 
is less than the minimum state filing 
requirement, no penalty may be 
applied . . . . 
(3) It is unlawful for any person with 
intent to evade any tax, to fail to timely 
remit the full amount of tax required by this 
chapter. A violation of this section is 
punishable as follows: 
(a) if the amount not remitted is less 
than $1,000, by fine not exceeding $1,000 or 
by imprisonment not exceeding three months or 
by both fine and imprisonment; 
(b) if the amount not remitted is 
$1,000 or more but less than $5,000, by a 
fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not 
to exceed six months or by both fine and 
imprisonment; 
(c) if the amount no remitted is $5,000 
or more, but less than $10,000 by a fine not 
exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not to 
exceed one year or by both fine and imprison-
ment; or 
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(d) if the amount not remitted is 
$10,000 or more, by a fine not exceeding 
$25,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five 
years or by both fine and imprisonment. 
(4) Any person who knowingly or intention-
ally makes, renders, signs or verifies any 
false or fraudulent return or statement or 
supplies any false or fraudulent information 
is guilty of the crime of making a false or 
inconsistent statement and is punishable as 
otherwise provided by law. 
(5) Any person, who with the intent to evade 
any tax or any requirement of this chapter, 
or any lawful requirement of the State Tax 
Commission, fails to pay the tax, or to make, 
render, sign, or verify any return, or to 
supply any information, within the time 
required by or under this chapter, or who, 
with like intent makes, renders, signs, or 
verifies any false or fraudulent return or 
statement, or supplies any false or fraudu-
lent information, is liable to a civil 
penalty of not more than $1,000 to be recov-
ered by the State Tax Commission in the same 
manner as provided in this chapter for the 
collection of delinquent taxes and is also 
guilty of Class B misdemeanor and shall be 
fined not to exceed $500 or be imprisoned not 
to exceed three months, or both. The fines 
provided by this section shall be additional 
to all other penalties in this chapter. . . . 
The evidence submitted by the Audit Division in support 
of the alleged fraudulent intent to evade penalty was provided by 
Mrs. Marisha Milligan, a compliance officer with the State Tax 
Commission. She testified that as part of her duties she was 
required to make determinations regarding recommendations to 
assess penalties. (R158, 159). She testified that her basis for 
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asserting the penalty against Dennis Silver was that it took a 
long time for him to file returns after he was first contacted 
and that she had requested a Writ of Mandate to obtain a court 
order requiring him to file the returns he had agreed to file. 
(R160). 
Mrs. Milligan also testified that: (1) she never 
contacted or asked Dennis Silver why he had not filed returns 
when due, and no one at the Tax Commission took any action to 
investigate what Silver was doing after the first contact by Mr. 
Rodall (R180-181); (2) that no one frpm the Tax Commission 
attempted to determine how long it would take petitioner to 
prepare the requested returns (R168-169); or (3) inquired what 
petitioner was doing to get the returns prepared. (R184-185). 
There was no testimony regarding fraudulent acts by Mr. Silver. 
On the contrary, when asked if she as aware of any attempt by Mr. 
Silver to mislead, conceal, or otherwise hide his filing inten-
tions she answered "No, I'm not." (R208) 
Mrs. Milligan testified that her understanding of the 
meaning of "intent to evade" as applied in this case was "lack of 
filing returns after request had been made for the returns to be 
filed," (R186) and that she was not aware of any Tax Commission 
regulations defining "intent to evade" or any federal law defin-
ing "intent to evade." (R207-208) 
-18-
Thusf the person in the Tax Commission responsible for 
asserting the Fraudulent Intent to Evade Tax Penalty, asserted 
the penalty without knowing why returns were not filed or what 
"standard" was to be used. The "standard" she used appears to be 
that Mr. Silver had not filed, and it took him too long to file 
after contacted by the Commission. This is not the standard 
provided by the statue or applicable case law. 
Dennis Silver testified that based on his understanding 
of the filing requirement, his income was below the legal thresh-
old for filing a Federal return. (R218) The legal requirement 
for filing a State income tax return is having to file a Federal 
return, Utah Code Ann. S 59-14A-48 (1973) renumbered 59-10-502 
(1987) (Addendum III). 
Each year he would review his tax records to see what 
his income was and to determine if he needed to file tax-returns. 
Based upon this review he believed he was not required to file 
Federal or State returns. (R237-238). In addition, Silver had 
been contacted by the Internal Revenue Service regarding the 
non-filing of his Federal returns and after an investigation the 
IRS had not required that he file Federal tax returns. (R219). 
Silver was surprised when the State Tax Commission 
required him to prepare returns but he agreed to do so. (R219) 
Silver testified that when he looked into what was going to be 
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required to prepare the returns.he found out he could not do it 
by himself and attempted to get help. (R220, 221) In April 1985 
he retained the services of a CPA who instructed him on what 
needed to be done before the CPA could prepare the returns. 
(R221, 234) After the Writ of Mandate was served on Silver, he 
contacted the Attorney General's office and informed them that he 
was working on the returns. (R224) The Attorney General's 
office extended him additional time to complete the returns. 
Dennis Silver had retained his records but due to the 
condition of the records and the number of years involved it took 
him a long time to assemble and summarize the information to 
prepare the Federal and State tax returqs. (R226) (A taxpayer 
must prepare a Federal return in order to do a State return). Up 
until the Writ of Mandate was served upon him, Silver did not 
realized that there was any particular deadline being imposed 
upon him to have the returns filed. (R220-223). 
The fraud penalty statute, 59-14A-92 (1986 Supplement), 
provides that a person must have had fraudulent intent to evade 
tax or other legal duty for the statute to apply. 
Fraudulent intent to evade tax must be determined on 
the basis of all facts and circumstances. Fraud under the cases 
cited above means actual intentional wrongdoing and the intent 
required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be 
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owed. Fraud is not to be imputed or presumed and the mere 
failure to report income is not sufficient to establish fraud, 
nor is the failure to file a return sufficient basis to establish 
fraudulent intent. 
Failure to file tax returns standing alone will not 
support assertion of a fraud penalty. 
In this case, there is no evidence that Dennis Silver 
intended to avoid any tax, because no tax was owed. There is no 
evidence that he was attempting to evade anything. He testified 
that he determined that he was not required to file tax returns 
by doing a summary review of his income. (R236-238) Had he 
filed tax returns he would have received refunds from both the 
State and Federal governments. (R218) 
After he was contacted by the Commission and returns 
required but before the Writ of Mandate was issued, he had begun 
assembling his records, hired a bookkeeper, hired an accountant 
and gave every indication of a good faith effort to comply with 
the Tax Commission's request. (R221) 
There was no effort on the part of the Tax Commission 
to determine what action had been taken, to determine the length 
of time it would reasonably take Silver to prepare the returns 
nor to establish any reasonable deadlines for completion. 
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Mrs. Milligan, who recommended the penalty be assessed, 
testified that she was unaware of any Commission regulation which 
defined "intent to evade." She testified she was unaware of any 
definition or legal standards with respect to determining "intent 
to evade." (R207-208) She testified that her basis for propos-
ing the penalty was solely upon the non-filing, even though she 
did not know the reason for such non-filing. (R165-166) Mrs. 
Milligan took the position that the Dennis Silver took too long 
in preparing the returns even though no one in the Commission, 
including Mrs. Milligan, investigated what was required or how 
long it would reasonably take. (R168-169) 
Clearly, the State Tax Commission has not interpreted 
or applied the statute and legal standards to establish fraudu-
lent intent to evade tax. 
The conclusion reached by the Tax Commission An their 
Final Decision, was that "petitioner intended to avoid filing 
income tax returns . . . and intended not to maintain sufficient 
information . . . ." (R18) This conclusion is not supported by 
the evidence and does not support th^ fraud penalty which 
requires a finding of "fraudulent intent to evade." 
On the other hand, Silver's uncontroverted testimony 
was that he believed he was below the filing threshold at the 
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time each of the returns was due to be filed and that he owed no 
tax. (R218) 
Based upon the foregoing it is clear that the Commis-
sion has misapplied the fraudulent intent to evade portion of the 
statute, as there is no evidence of any intent on the part of 
Silver to defraud the State of Utah. There is also ample evi-
dence that he had a good faith belief that he was not required to 
file State income tax returns. 
POINT 2 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH "FRAUD" AND 
"INTENT TO EVADE TAX* IS UPON THE TAX COMMIS-
SION AND THE "FRAUDULENT INTENT TO EVADE" 
PENALTY REQUIRES A FACTUAL DETERMINATION OF 
FRAUDULENT ACTS WITH INTENT TO EVADE TAX IN 
ORDER TO SUPPORT ASSESSMENT OF THE FRAUD 
PENALTY. 
A. The Burden of Proof is Upon the Commission to Show 
that Dennis Silver has Been Guilty of Fraud with Intent -to Evade 
Tax. 
Section 59-14A-94 (1986 Supplement) (Addendum II) 
titled Burden of Proof, renumbered 59-10-543, establishes that 
for purposes of taxation the burden of proof requirement to be 
followed in any proceeding before the Commission is as follows: 
In any proceeding before the Tax Commission 
under this act, the burden of proof shall be 
upon the petitioner except for the following 
issues, as to which the burden of proof shall 
be upon the Tax Commission: 
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(1) Whether the petitioner has been guilty 
of fraud with intent to evade tax; 
(emphas i s added) 
The clear legislative intern, uj. uie ^uatute is that 
there must be some credible evidence available to the Commission 
to support a claim of fraudulent intent to evade tax. The burden 
is upon the Commission to investigate the facts and establish 
under statutory and judicial guidelines that there is conduct by 
the taxpayer which would support a claim of fraudulent intent to 
evade tax by clear and convincing evidence. 
B. The Commission Did Not Investigate the Facts of 
this Case or Attempt to Determine if Silver's Conduct was 
Fraudulent. 
Mr. Silver testified that he did not believe he was 
required to file a State income tax return because he was not 
required to file a Federal income tax return due to-his low 
income and the fact that he did not owe any tax. (R218-219). 
The Tax Commission contacted Silver by letter on or 
around August 16, 1984. (R148) Silver called and spoke with Mr. 
Rodall on or around August 22, at which time Silver was informed 
that he would be required to file income tax returns for 1978 
through 1983. (R219) Silver agreed to file the requested 
returns. (R219) 
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Thereafter, no further, action was taken on part of the 
Tax Commission to contact Silver. (R164-166) Nor was any 
further investigation conducted prior to the recommendation or 
assessment of the fraud penalty. (R175). Silver stipulated to 
the entry of the Writ of Mandate (R224) as he was working on the 
preparation of the returns. 
The attorney general's office worked with Mr. Silver 
extending time for him to complete his returns through March of 
1986 at which time an Order to Show Cause hearing was scheduled. 
(R176). 
At the Order to Show Cause hearing, the court extended 
an additional 30 days, based upon Silver's testimony, in order 
for him to complete the filing of the income tax returns. (R230) 
The Tax Commission contends, contrary to established 
law, that fraudulent intent to evade can be inferred -from the 
fact that Silver did not file returns by the original due date 
(although there is no finding that returns were in fact 
required), and it took him too long to prepare returns when they 
were required, even though nothing was done to determine how long 
it would take. 
The Tax Commissions Final Decision cites no factual 
finding of fraudulent conduct. On the contrary, the decision in 
the "Findings of Fact" notes that the "Petitioner further cites 
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that he knew during this period that he did not have sufficient 
income to file returns . . . ." (R16) 
The conclusions reached by the Commission do not cite 
fraudulent intent to evade tax. The decision concludes that 
"petitioner intended to avoid filing . .
 ¥" and " . . . intended 
not to maintain sufficient information . . ." (R18) This is 
not the statutory standard for fraud. Dennis Silver believed he 
was not required to file, it follows that he would not file. He 
did not evade tax by not filing, no tax was due. There is no 
support in the record or the factual findings to conclude there 
was fraudulent intent to evade tax, filing requirements, or any 
other legal obligation. 
Clearly, the Tax Commission has not carried the burden 
of proof to show that Petitioner has be^n guilty of fraud with 
intent to evade tax. 
POINT 3 
THE COMMISSION HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS AND HAS FILED LIENS AGAINST 
PETITIONER PRIOR TO A FINAL DETERMINATION OF 
THE PENALTY. 
A. The Utah Code Provides Statutory Procedures to be 
Followed Prior to the Filing of Tax Liem>4 
If the Tax Commission establishes through an audit or 
other procedure that a taxpayer owes additional taxes, it must 
give notice of the deficiency stating th£ amount due and demand 
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payment. The notice must set , forth the details of the defi-
ciency, indicate how it was calculated and be mailed to the 
taxpayer at his last known address. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-524 
(1987) provides: 
(1) If the Commission determines that there 
is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed 
by this chapter, it shall send notice of such 
deficiency to the taxpayer in the manner and 
with the content provided in subsection (2). 
(2) The notice of deficiency shall set forth 
the details of the deficiency and the manner 
of its computation. It shall be mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the taxpayer at his last 
known address . . . . 
A notice of deficiency is final thirty (30) days after 
the date of the mailing or when the taxpayer consents in writing 
to the amount of the deficiency. A taxpayer can stop the defi-
ciency from becoming final by filing a petition for 
redetermination and challenging the deficiency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-525 (1987) provides: 
(1) except in any case where the taxpayer 
has earlier filed with the Commission a 
petition for redetermination of the defi-
ciency as provided in Part V, Chapter 1, 
Title 59, the notice of deficiency shall 
constitute a final assessment of the defi-
ciency in tax, including interest thereon and 
any penalties or additions to tax; 
(a) upon the expiration of thirty (30) 
days, or ninety (90) days if the notice is 
addressed to a person outside the states of 
the union and the District of Columbia, after 
the date of mailing of the notice of defi-
ciency to the taxpayer; or 
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(b) upon the date, when in writing, the 
taxpayer agrees with the Commission that a 
deficiency exists in a specified amount and 
consents to the assessment of such 
deficiency, . . . 
If the assessment remains unpaid after it becomes 
final, the Tax Commission then issues a notice and demand stating 
the amount due and demanding payment. Warrants may be issued 
authorizing the local sheriff to levy upon and sell real or 
personal property of the taxpayer to cover the amount assessed, 
including collection costs, if a taxpayer fails to pay delinquent 
amounts within ten (10) days after notice ana demand. 
When the sheriff receives the warrant he files a 
duplicate with the Clerk of the local District Court who enters 
it on the court's judgment docket listing the taxpayer as a 
judgment debtor. The amount entered constitutes a binding lien 
on real, personal or other property to the same extent -as other 
court judgments. Utah Code Ann. §59-10-528 (1987) provides: 
(3) If any person liable under this Chapter 
for any payment of any tax, addition to tax, 
penalty, or other interest neglects or 
refused to pay the same within ten days after 
notice and demand for the payment has been 
given to such person under subsection (2) the 
Commission may issue a warrant in duplicate 
under its official seal directed to the 
sheriff of any county of the state commanding 
him to levy upon and sell such persons real 
and personal property for the payment of the 
amount assessed, plus the cost of executing 
the warrant, and to return such warrant to 
the Commission and to pay to it the money 
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collected by virtue thereof within sixty (60) 
days after the receipt of the warrant . . . . 
(4) Any sheriff who receives a warrant under 
subsection (3) shall within five (5) days 
thereafter file the duplicate copy with the 
clerk of the district court of the appropri-
ate county. The clerk of such court shall 
thereupon enter in the judgment docket in the 
column for judgment debtors the name of the 
taxpayer mentioned in the warrant and in the 
appropriate column the tax or other amounts 
for which the warrant is issued and date when 
such copy is filed. Such amount shall 
thereupon be a binding lien upon the real, 
personal and other property of the taxpayer 
to the same extent as other judgments duly 
docketed in the office of the clerk. . . 
(emphasis added) 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-501 (1987) entitled "Procedure 
for Obtaining Redetermination of a Deficiency," states "any 
taxpayer may file a request for agency action petitioning the 
Commission for redetermination of a deficiency." Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-1-503 (1987) provides: 
(1) Following a redetermination of a defi-
ciency by the Commission, the entire amount 
determined as the deficiency by the decision 
of the Commission which has become final, 
shall be assessed and shall be paid within 
ten (10) days after notice and demand from 
the Commission. 
(2) If the taxpayer does not file a petition 
with the Commission within the time pre-
scribed for filing a petition, the deficiency 
notice of which has been mailed to the 
taxpayer shall be assessed, and shall be paid 
within ten (10) days after notice and demand 
from the Commission . . . . 
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Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-504 (1987) entitled "Time Determination 
Final," provides: 
The action of the Commission oh the taxpay-
er's petition for redetermination of defi-
ciency shall be final thirty (30) days after 
the date of mailing of the Commission's 
notice of agency action. All [tax, interest 
and penalties are due thirty (30) days from 
the date of mailing, unless the taxpayer 
seeks judicial review. 
Taking these statutes together, if a taxpayer disagrees 
with a notice of deficiency under § 59-10-*524 he may petition for 
redetermination under § 59-1-501. Any subsequent determination 
of the Tax Commission does not become final until thirty (30) 
days after the mailing of the agency's decision to the taxpayer 
under § 59-1-504. If a taxpayer is not satisfied with the 
results of a petition for redetermination he can take further 
action by filing a petition for review in the Tax Court Division 
of the District Court and ultimately to the Utah Supreme Court. 
So long as the taxpayer meets his deadlihes for filing appeals, 
the decision of the Tax Commission does not become final and no 
statutory lien may arise against the taxpayer under § 59-1-503 
and § 59-10-528. The docketing of a warrant while a petition for 
redetermination is pending and before the decision of the Tax 
Commission became final would not give risp to a v^liH qfai-ni-nrv 
lien. 
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The only notice that Dennis Silver has received of the 
proposed deficiency was mailed to him on or around November 3, 
1986. On November 17
 f 1986 a petition for redetermination was 
filed on behalf of Mr. Silver requesting reconsideration of the 
proposed deficiency. On March 16f 1987 the Tax Commission 
acknowledged receipt of the request for redetermination and 
thereafter on March 31, 1987 prior to the final determination of 
the Commission (which did not take place until March 23, 1989) a 
Warrant was issued and filed with the Third District Court for 
Utah. The Warrant was issued at a time when an appeal was 
pending before the Tax Commission which had not been acted upon 
and therefore the proposed deficiency could not have become 
final. Based upon the foregoing the lien against the petition-
er's property should be released pending a final determination by 
the Court of the taxpayer's liability. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by this brief, the burden of proof to 
establish fraudulent intent to evade tax is upon the Utah State 
Tax Commission. The evidence presented by the Tax Commission in 
support of its asserted fraud penalty does not meet the statutory 
or judicial standards for assessment of a fraud penalty. 
The penalty statue, S 59-14A-92, provides that there 
must have been fraudulent "intent to evade" on the part of a 
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taxpayer in order to assert the penalty. Fraudulent intent to 
evade may be shown by all of the facts and surrounding circum-
stances, but the failure to file tax return without other fraudu-
lent acts does not alone support a finding of fraudulent intent 
to evade. Nor does delay in responding to the Tax Commission's 
request that returns be filed become fraud where there is no 
evidence of fraudulent intent to evade or avoid a tax or other 
requirement of law. Here the evidence is clear that there was no 
such intent. At worst, petitioner may have been negligent in 
failing to properly determine if in fact tax returns were 
required to be filed. The fact that no tax was ever owed sup-
ports the petitioner's position that there could be no fraudulent 
intent to evade tax. Non-filing of tax returns standing alone 
simply will not support a finding of fraudulent intent to evade 
tax particularly where no tax is due. 
The lien filed by the Tax Commission against petition-
er's property while his appeal was pending was filed in error. 
For the above and foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted 
that the decision of the Tax Commission asserting a fraud penalty 
against Mr. Silver should be reversed, Mr. Silver be awarded 
attorneys' fees and costs against the Tax Commission and the lien 
against his property voided. 
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ADDENDUM I 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX ACT OF 19731 59-14A-92 
59-14A-91. Repealed. 
Repeal. — Section 59-14A-91 (L. 1973, ch. jeopardy assessments, was repealed by Laws 
147, § 91; 1977, ch. 80, § 14), relating to 1983, ch. 283, § 10. 
59-14A-92. Civil and criminal penalties — Limitation of 
prosecution. 
(1) Every person who, without fraudulent intent, fads to make, render, 
sign, or verify any return, or to supply any information within the time 
required by or under the provisions of this chapter, is liable to a penalty of 
$50 to be imposed, assessed, and collected by the tax commission in the 
same manner as is provided by this chapter with regard to delinquent 
taxes. This $50 penalty does not apply to returns disclosing a refund until 
90 days after the date the return is due. After 90 days the penalty shall be 
half the refund or $50, whichever is less. If a refund return is filed and the 
gross income reported is less than the minimum state filing requirement, 
no penalty may be applied. 
(2) As used in this section, "person" means an individual, partnership, 
corporation, employer, joint-stock company, association or marketing asso-
ciation, or any officer or employee of any corporation, or member or any 
officer or employee of any partnership. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person, with intent to evade any tax, to fail to 
timely remit the full amount of tax required by this chapter. A violation of 
this section is punishable as follows: 
(a) if the amount not remitted is less than $1,000, by a fine not 
exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding three months or by 
both fine and imprisonment; 
(b) if the amount not remitted is $1,000 or more, but less than 
$5,000, by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 
six months or by both fine and imprisonment; 
(c) if the amount not remitted is $5,000 or more, but less than 
$10,000, by a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 
one year or by both fine and imprisonment; or 
(d) if the amount not remitted is $10,000 or more, by a fine not 
exceeding $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed five years or by both 
fine and imprisonment. 
(4) Any person who knowingly or intentionally makes, renders, signs, or 
verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement or supplies any false or 
fraudulent information is guilty of the crime of making a false or inconsis-
tent s tatement and is punishable as otherwise provided by law. 
(5) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or any requirement of 
this chapter, or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails 
to pay the tax, or to make, render, sign, or verify any return, or to supply 
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any information, within the time required by or under this chapter, or who, 
with like intent, makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent 
return or statement, or supplies any false or fraudulent information, is 
liable to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 to be recovered by the State 
Tax Commission in the same, manner as provided in this chapter for the 
collection of delinquent taxes, and is also guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
and shall be fined not to exceed $500 or be imprisoned not to exceed three 
months, or both. The fines provided by this section shall be additional to all 
other penalties in this chapter. 
(6) Upon making a record of its reasons for waiver or reduction, the State 
Tax Commission may waive or reduce any of the civil penalties provided in 
this chapter or compromise them. 
(7) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this sec-
tion is six years from the date the tax should have been remitted according 
to this chapter. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 92; 1983, ch. 
266, § 3; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 13, § 1; 1985, 
ch. 193, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 56. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment substituted "person" for "individual, 
partnership, corporation, employer, joint-
stock company, association or marketing as-
sociation, or any officer or employee of any 
corporation, or member, or employee of any 
partnership, or any officer or employee 
thereof in the first paragraph of subsec. (1); 
substituted "chapter^ for "act" throughout 
the section; added the second paragraph of 
subsec. (1); inserted subsecs. (2) and (3); in-
serted "civil" before "penalty" in subsec. (4); 
reduced the maximum term of imprisonment 
from 6 to 3 months in subsec. (4); added 
subsec. (6); and made minor changes in phra-
seology, punctuation, and style. 
The 1984 (2nd S.S.) amendment deleted 
"referred to in subsection (2)" after "Every 
person" in subsecs. (3) and (4). 
The 1985 amendment added the second 
through fourth sentences to Subsection (1), 
designated the second paragraph of Subsec-
tion (1) as Subsection (2); renumbered former 
Subsections (2) through (6) as Subsections (3) 
through (7); deleted "the provisions of" in 
Subsection (3), substituted "Any person" for 
"Every person" at the beginning of Subsec-
tions (4) and (5); substituted "State Tax Com-
mission" for "tax commission thereunder" 
and for "tax commission"; deleted "the provi-
sions of" preceding "this chapter, or who,"; 
deleted "is" preceding "provided in this chap; 
ter" in Subsection (5); substituted "for waiver 
or reduction, the State Tax Commission may1? 
for "therefor the tax commission has the 
power, in its discretion, to"; substituted 
"them" for "the same" in Subsection (6); suln 
stituted "is" for "shall be" preceding "six 
years from the date"; deleted "the provisions 
of* in Subsection (7); and made changes in 
phraseology throughout the section. 
The 1986 amendment added "or" at the end 
of Subsection (3)(c) and inserted "class B" in 
the first sentence of Subsection (5). 
Cross-References. — Penalty for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Effective Date. — Section 2 of Laws 1984 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 13 provided: 'This act shall 
take effect upon approval by the governor, or 
the day following the constitutional time' 
limit of Article VII, Sec. 8 without the gover-! 
nor's signature, or in the case of veto, the 
date of veto override." Approved April 6,* 
1984. 
Section 2 of Laws 1985, ch. 193 provided: 
"This act has retrospective operation to Janu-
ary 1, 1985 M 
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ADDENDUM I I 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX ACT OF 1973 59-14A-96 
59-14A-94. B u r d e n of proof. 
In any proceeding before the tax commission under this act, the burden of 
proof shall be upon the petitioner except for the following issues, as to 
which the burden of proof shall be upon the tax commission: 
(1) whether the petitioner has been guilty of fraud with intent to 
evade tax; 
(2) whether the petitioner is liable as the transferee of property of a 
taxpayer, but not to show that the taxpayer was liable for the tax; and 
(3) whether the petitioner is liable for any increase in a deficiency 
where such increase is asserted initially after a notice of deficiency was 
mailed and a petition under Chapter 30, Title 59 is filed, unless such 
increase in deficiency is the result of a change or correction of federal 
taxable income required to be reported, and of which change or correc-
tion the tax commission had no notice at the time it mailed the notice 
of deficiency. 
ADDENDUM III 
910 
Cite as 11 AFTR 
Supreme Court has made it clear in 
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Naviga-
tion Co., 370 U.S. 1 [9 AFTR 2d 1594] 
(1962), that a showing of irreparable in-
jury is insufficient to overcome the bar-
rier of § 7421(a) . In that case, the Su-
preme Court said that only where there 
is no adequate remedy at law and "it is 
clear that under no circumstances could 
the Government ultimately prevail" can 
a suit for an injunction be maintained.1 
Id. at 7. The appellants have not met 
that double burden. 
There may be some doubt about the 
ultimate liability of appellant Montagni, 
since it is alleged that he was not at any 
time an officer or employee of the bank-
rupt corporation and § 6671(b) of the 
Code s tates that the word "person*' as 
used in § 6672 "includes an officer or 
employee of a corporation * * *.** But 
Montagni was a substantial stockholder 
of the corporation, and for aught that 
appears in the complaint he may also 
have been a director. I t may well be 
that the reference to officers and em-
ployees in § 6671(b) is exemplary and 
not exclusive. In United States v. Gra-
ham, 309 F.2d 210 [10 AFTR 2d 5807] 
(1962), the Ninth Circuit held that a 
director could be liable under § 6672, say-
ing that the word "person** was not 
strictly limited to officers and employ-
ees, but included "all those so connected 
wi th a corporation as to be responsible 
for the performance of the act in respect 
of which the violation occurred.*' Id. at 
212. W e need not decide that question 
now. It is sufficient that the appellants 
have not met the requirement of show-
ing that under a view of the law most 
favorable to the government, it cannot 
establish its claim. No more is required 
of the government than that it act in 
good faith. Enochs, supra, at 7. Since 
the appellants have not shown that the 
government has not so acted here, their 
complaint was properly dismissed.' 
Affirmed. 
BOTTA v. SCANLON 
2d 908 (314 F.2d 392) 
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Joseph A. CIRILLO and Martha R-
Cirillo, Petitioners, 
v. 
COMMISSIONER of rntcrna! Revenue, 
Respondent. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Joseph A Cirillo and Martha R CiriUo, 
Respondents. 
U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 
Nos . 13.902, 13,903, Mar. 1, 1963. 314 
F.2d 478. 
fl 61,192 P-H Memo TC (Opinion by 
Bruce, J.) affirmed in part and re-
versed in part. Years 1945—1954. 
Decision in part for Government and 
in part for taxpayer. 
1. A S S E S S M E N T A N D COLLECTION 
—Interest and additions—fraud pen-
alty—failure to file return. 
Taxpayer not liable for fraud penalty 
imposed for the years 1945-1951; fraud 
penalty properly imposed for the years 
1952-1954. Taxpayer, a "part-time** law-
yer, received his W-2 forms from his full 
time employers, but failed to file returns 
reporting the income from either full 
time employment or his part time law 
practice. The Commissioner failed to 
prove taxpayer, in the years 1945-1951, 
intended to evade taxes since from tax-
payer's rough calculations the income 
tax withheld indicated he had overpaid 
taxes. For the years 1952-1954, even 
rough calculations would show substan-
tial deficiencies. The Commissioner 
proved taxpayer's fradulent intent in 
failing to file in these years. Reference; 
1963 P-H Fed. \ 19,199. 
2. ASSESSMENT A N D COLLECTION 
" —Interest and additions—fraud pen-
alty—amount. 
The fraud penalty under the *39 Code 
where there is a failure to file a timely 
return is imposed upon the correct tax 
1
 Any implication in Botta v. Scanlon. 288 F. 2d 504 (7 AFTR 2d 9G61 <2 Cir. 1961). and 
National Foundry Co. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 229 F.2d 149 f48 AFTR 8533 (2 Cir. 
195G) tha t either one of these circumstances may alone be sufficient is overruled by 
Enochs. 
* The district court found that the appellants' allegations of financial hardship did not 
present "special circumstances" sufficient to maintain their suit. Compare our prior 
opinion in this case. 288 F.2d a t 508. where we said that the "special and extraordinary 
circumstances" which permit a suit to restrain the collection of taxes do not "embrace 
financial hardship in making the payment." Since we dispose of the case on other 
grounds, we do not consider whether, under the bifurcated requirement established by 
Enochs, the allegations of financial hardship were sufficient to show that there was no 
adequate remedy a t law. 
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liability without any deduction for either 
income taxes withheld or the amount of 
tax shown on the delinquent returns. 
Reference: 1963 P-H Fed. fl 19,192. 
3. INDIVIDUAL. RETURNS—Joint re-
turns' of husband and wife—liability 
for tax and penalties. 
Wife not liable for fraud penalty im-
posed after filing delinquent joint re-
turns with her husband for the years in-
volved. The husband's fraud was based 
on his failure to file a timely return and 
not on anything contained in the delin-
quent joint return. Reference: 1963 P-H 
Fed. f 17,029. 
James C. Larrimer, Dougherty, Lar-
rimer & Lee, 3220 Grant Bldg., Pitts-
burgh 19, Pa., Atty. for Petitioners in 
13902 and Respondent in 13903. 
David I. Granger, Atty., Dept. of Jus-
tice, Wash. 25, D.C., for Respondent in 
13902 and Petitioner in 13903. 
On Petitions for Review of a Decision 
of the Tax Court of the United States. 
Before McLAUGHLIN and HASTIE. 
Circuit Judges; and DUMBAULD. Dis-
trict Judge. 
Opinion of the Court 
HASTIE, Circuit Judge: 
In June, 1957, Joseph Cirilio and his 
wife, Martha, jointly filed their first in-
come tax returns for the years 1945 to 
1954, inclusive. They acted after having 
learned that revenue agents were inves-
t igating the husband's tax liability. 
Throughout the years in question, the 
husband had received both a regular sal-
ary as a municipal employee, from which 
appropriate sums had been withheld on 
account of income taxes, and modest 
fees earned in the part-time practice of 
law. The wife had received no income. 
The Commissioner disallowed certain de-
ductions claimed in the delinquent re-
turns and imposed penalties. The con-
troversy ultimately reached the Tax 
Court, which sustained the deficiencies 
determined by the Commissioner and 
held that part of each annual deficiency 
had resulted from fraud with intent to 
evade taxes. 'The Tax Court held both 
spouses liable for the amounts of the 
deficiencies not covered by salary with-
holdings and imposed an additional 50% 
fraud penalty for each year upon the 
husband alone, i T.C. Memo 1961-192. 
The case is here on cross petitions 
wherein the spouses urge that the fraud 
penalty w a s both unjustified and errone-
ously computed, while the Commissioner 
claims that fraud penalties should have 
been imposed upon both husband and 
wife. 
[ 1 ] Before the Tax Court. Joseph 
Cirilio, whom we shall call the taxpayer, 
testified that he had failed to file timely 
returns, not because of any intent to 
defraud, but because he believed, on the 
basis of a summary mental calculation 
made at the end of each year, that the 
withholdings from his salary alone were 
enough to cover all income taxes pay-
able on both his salary and his small net 
income from private law practice. Cf. 
First Trust & Sav. Bank v. United 
States, 8th Cir. 1953, 206 F.2d 97 [44 
AFTR 239] . However, he concedes that 
he kept no systematic records of re-
ceipts and expenditures in the course of 
his practice and made no detailed com-
putation of his tax liability at the end of 
each taxable year. In the absence of 
such records, he urges that the good 
faith and reasonableness of his asserted 
belief that his taxes were covered by 
salary withholdings are substantiated by 
l T h e T a x 
Year 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
C o u r t ' s c o m p u t a t i o n w a s a s follows 
Taxable 
Net Income 
$ 4,552.28 
4,912.62 
4.931.5S 
5.192.38 
5.578.35 
6.092.12 
6,368.59 
8.402.91 
10.132.22 
7.093.42 
Corrected 
Income Tax 
Liability * 
5 644.00 
575.00 
679.19 
563.14 
627.20 
754.48 
943.36 
1.528.32 
1.903.20 
1.480.54 
i : 
Tax 
Withheld 
% 543.40 
550.40 
619.20 
646.00 
614.00 
667.80 
808.70 
991.20 
1.015.20 
914.40 
Additional 
Tax Due 
$100.60 
24.60 
59.99 
12.80 
86.68 
134.66 
537.12 
888.00 
566.14 
Over-
payment 
$82.86 
* F o r e a c h y e a r t h e add i t i ona l f r a u d p e n a l t y w a s 60% of t h e a m o u n t shown In th i s 
c o l u m n . 
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the subsequent detailed computations bilities, withholdings and consequent ob-
which appear in the delinquent returns ligations and overpayments shown on 
filed in 1957. In summary, the tax lia- those returns are as follows: 
Tax 
Year Liability 
1945 ,$ 498.00 
1946 500.00 
1947 522.00 
1948 495.66 
1949 460.24 
1950 490 38 
1951 664.92 
1952 991.94 
1953 1.244.71 
1954 1,123.72 
Tax 
Withheld 
$ 543.40 
550.40 
619.20 
646.00 
614.00 
667.80 
808.70 
991.20 
1,015.20 
914.40 
Additional 
Tax Due 
$ 
.74 
229.51 
209.32 
Over-
payment 
of Tax 
$ 45.40 
50.40 
97.20 
150.34 
153.76 
177.42 
143.78 
Although the T a x Court disallowed 
about half of the deductions claimed in 
these returns, the taxpayer relies on the 
court's finding" that "there is no conten-
tion or showing that the delinquent re-
turns involved here are fraudulent". 
The taxpayer does not challenge the 
existence of deficiencies or their amounts 
as found by the Tax Court. Therefore, 
we have to consider only whether and 
to what extent fraud penalties were 
justified. 
The evidence in this case strongly in-
dicates that the taxpayer's failure to file 
returns w a s a willful neglect of a statu-
tory duty. A s a lawyer, he must have 
been aware that one who earns several 
thousand dollars a year is obligated to 
file income tax returns. Each year he 
was reminded of his duty to file a return 
by the standard W-2 Form which he re-
ceived from his employer. Moreover, he 
has been convicted of the misdemeanor 
of willful failure to file income tax re-
turns for the years 1953 and 1954. United 
States v. Cirillo, 3d Cir. 1957, 251 F.2d 
638 [1 AFTR 2d 451] , cert, denied, 1958, 
356 U.S. 949.2 
But willful failure to file a timely re-
turn, which may create both criminal 
liability and an additional civil liability. 
does not in itself and without more es-
tablish liability for a fraud penalty, 
though it may be relevant in that con-
nection. Jones v. Commissioner. 5th Cir. 
1958, 259 F.2d 300 [2 A F T R 2d 5736] . 
This is true because a fraud penalty can 
be imposed only where proof of a defi-
ciency is supplemented by proof that the 
"deficiency is due to fraud with intent to 
evade tax". I n t Rev. Code of 1939, § 293 
(b) , ch. 2, 53 Stat. 88; cf. I n t Rev. Code 
of 1954. § 6653(b). First Trust & Sav. 
Bank v. United States, supra. The criti-
cal question is whether the circum-
stances attending a particular failure to 
file warrant an inference of intention to 
evade taxes . Moreover, the evidence 
must be evaluated in the light of the 
settled rule that fraud can be established 
only by clear and convincing proof or, as 
we have put it, "by something impres-
sively more than a slight preponderance 
of evidence". Valetti v. Commissioner, 
3d Cir. 1958. 260 F.2d 185, 188 [2 A F T R 
2d 5914]. Accord, Goldberg v. Commis-
sioner. 5th Cir. 1956, 239 F.2d 316 [50 
AFTR-1155] . To justify a fraud penalty 
the circumstances surrounding the fail-
ure to file returns must strongly and un-
equivocally indicate an intention to avoid 
the payment of taxes. Powel l v. Gran-
quist, 9th Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 56 [1 AFTR 
•Taxpayer complains tha t the admission into evidence of the record of his conviction 
of willful failure to file returns was error, and that, in any event, tho court should have 
allowed him to show the limited scope of the evidence on which that conviction was based. 
He is mistaken. His conviction was admissible as evidence of the fact that his failure to 
file returns for the two years in question was willful. Richard F. Smith. 1958. 31 T.C. 1. 9; 
see Stagecrafters* Club. Inc v District of Columbia Division of American Legion. D.D.C. 
1953. I l l F. Supp. 127, aff'd. (sic] mem . D C. Cir. 1954, 211 F.2d 81 [811. affj:., 110 F. Supp. 
481. 43 AFTR 504}; cf. Masters v. Commissioner. 3d Cir. 957. 243 F 2d 335, 338-39 f51 AFTR 
84J (admissibility of conviction on nolo contendere plea, if not as a conclusive determina-
tion of that fact, compare Meyer J. Safra, 1958. 30 T.C. 1026, 1034-35, nonacq., 19C2 Int. 
Rev. Bull. No 43. a t 8, with Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 1951. 340 U.S. 
558, 5G8-C9 (dictum). 
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2d 7 1 9 ] ; cf. Bender v. Commissioner, 7th 
O r . 1958, 256 F.2d 771 [2 AFTR 2d 5078] . 
Taxpayer contends that his willful 
failure to file was not and could not have 
been the result of a scheme to cheat the 
government out of taxes which he was 
obligated to pay, because he did not be-
lieve that he owed any taxes. We are 
aware that the Tax Court disbelieved 
this testimony and that it is not for this 
appellate court to assess taxpayer's 
credibility as a witness. However, the 
Commissioner's heavy burden of proof 
on the issue of fraud cannot be satisfied 
by mere disbelief of taxpayer's testi-
mony. The record must contain some 
convincing" affirmative indication of the 
required specific intent. 
Taxpayer's delinquent returns lend 
considerable credibility to his testimony 
concerning the years from 1945 through 
1951. Taking into account the expenses 
which he believed he was entitled to de-
duct plus the credit for income taxes 
withheld, taxpayer calculated that he 
had overpaid his taxes for each of those 
years by amounts in order of fifty to one 
hundred seventy-five dollars. These de-
linquent returns were not fraudulent, 
and there is no showing or argument 
that any of the deductions claimed but 
disallowed were fictitious. Only because 
taxpayer was unable to substantiate 
them with the kind of records which the 
Commissioner properly demanded3 w a s 
it determined that he owed additional 
taxes for each of these years except 
1948. And for that year it is agreed that 
he owes nothing. All of this corrobo-
rates taxpayer's testimony that at the 
end of each of these years he believed 
that he owed the government no taxes 
beyond what had already been withheld 
from his salary. 
In the face of this evidence, the Com-
missioner offered little to sustain his 
burden of proving fraud for the years 
1945 to 1951. Apart from evidence 
which, as already pointed out, builds a 
very strong case of willful failure to file 
without demonstrating the intent which 
accompanied that failure, the only evi-
dence offered by the Commissioner w a s 
the taxpa3'er's failure to keep sys tem-
atic and detailed records of income and 
expenditures of his law practice. The 
significance of this omission is mini-
mized by the fact that from 1945 
• Of course, the burden of proof on this 
sioner. 4th O r . 1950. 179 F.2d 483 [38 AFTR 
[ 910 (314 F.2d 478) 
through 1951, taxpayer's practice was 
very small, never yielding receipts in 
excess of $2200 in any year and, in sev-
eral years, yielding less than $1000. In-
deed, government agents conceded that, 
even without such records, they were 
able to determine the amount of taxpay-
er's earnings from bank deposit state-
ments retained by him, and that there 
was no indication that taxpayer had re-
ceived additional income not reflected in 
these statements. Thus, the only needed 
information which was lacking because 
of the taxpayer's failure to keep books 
was a record of the expenditures which 
he made in the regular course of his law 
practice. In these circumstances, any 
inference that taxpayer's unbusiness-
like procedure was intended to conceal 
tax liability is too weak to achieve the 
clear and convincing character which 
proof of fraud must exhibit 
The years 1952, 1953 and 1954 present 
a different picture. In 1952, taxpayer's 
gross income from his law practice in-
creased very substantially to $4,169.70, 
four times as much as it had been in 
any year before 1951 and twice as much 
as it had been in 1951, while his deduc-
tible expenses did not increase propor-
tionately. Moreover, withholdings did 
not increase substantially. As a conse-
quence, the tax withheld from taxpay-
er's salary in 1952 was more than $500 
short of covering: his total tax liability. 
Even his own calculations for 1952, made 
several years later, failed to disclose an 
overpayment such as those he consist-
ently claimed for the years before 1952. 
And for 1953 and 1954, taxpayer's delin-
quent returns admitted substantial defi-
ciencies. Thus, the record indicates that 
at the end of 1952 and thereafter, even a 
rough calculation, honestly made, would 
at least have shown the taxpayer that 
there was need for a more careful anal-
ysis of income and expenditures to sub-
stantiate or dissipate his hope that no 
additional taxes were due. His disingen-
uous avoidance of accurate knowledge 
when the need for such knowledge must 
have been apparent w a s in itself a sub-
stantial indication of fraudulent intent. 
We conclude, therefore, that the evi-
dence of fraud was sufficiently clear and 
convincing to justify the imposition of 
fraud penalties for the years 1952, 1953 
and 1954. Not so, however, for the years 
from 1945 through 1951. 
was on the taxpayer. Burka v. Commis-
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£2J Our next consideration is the 
method employed by the Tax Court in 
computing fraud penalties Section 293 
(b) of the 1939 Code provides that "if 
any part of any deficiency is due to 
fraud", a fraud penalty shall be imposed 
at the rate of "50 per centum of the 
total amount of the deficiency". In this 
case the Tax Court added 50% to the 
taxpayer's total liability for each year 
as a fraud penalty, without having sub-
tracted either the amount withheld from 
salary or the amount of tax reported on 
the delinquent return. 
In section 271(a) as amended, 58 
Stat. 245 (1944:), "deficiency" is defined 
as "the amount by which the tax im-
posed by this chapter exceeds . . . the 
amount shown as the tax by the tax-
payer upon his return, if a return w a s 
made. . . .*' Section 271(b) (1) explicitly 
provides that "the tax imposed by this 
chapter and the tax shown on the return 
shall both be determined . . . without 
regard to the credit under section 35 
[for amounts withheld from w a g e s ] . 
. . ." This language makes it clear that 
neither the existence nor the amount of 
the "deficiency" of a taxpayer who has 
failed to file a return is affected in any 
way by the existence of a withholding 
credit partially or fully offsetting his tax 
liability. Moreover, in the circumstances 
of this case the "total amount of the 
deficiency", upon which the fraud penalty 
is based, must be the entire amount of 
the "tax imposed" for the year unless, 
under the section 271 definition of de-
ficiency, it is permissible to deduct from 
that total tax liability the amount of 
tax shown on the delinquent return filed 
several years after the due date. We 
think this is not permissible. 
1952 is the first year as to which we 
have concluded that fraud was proved. 
When the deadline for filing a 1952 tax 
return passed, a "deficiency" in the 
amount of "the tax imposed" came into 
existence. Because no return had then 
been filed, there simply was no "amount 
shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon 
his return" to be deducted from the 
total tax liability in computing the "de-
ficiency". And since the failure to file 
was fraudulent the taxpayer's liability 
at that time included a fraud penalty 
measured by that deficiency. Thus, tax-
payer has to take the position that al-
though, from 1953 until his delinquent 
filing in 1957, he was liable for a 1952 
C1RILIX) v. COMM. 
2d 910 (314 F 2d US) 
ftaud penalty measuied by his total 1952 
tax liability, he could terminate that 
liability for fiaud by filing a delinquent 
return admitting his full tax liability. It 
is not surprising that the Tax Court has 
consistently refused to give any such 
effect to a delinquent filing, reasoning 
that the "return" contemplated by sec-
tion 271 is a timely return. Charles F 
Bennett, 1958, 30 T.C. 114; Maitland A. 
Wilson, 1946, 7 T.C. 392 [395] ; sec George 
M. Still, Inc., 1953, 19 T.C. 1072, affd 
mem., 2d Cir. 1955, 218 F.2d 639 [46 
AFTR 1538] (correction of fraudulent 
return by amended return does not affect 
computation of fraud penalty); Cf Simon 
v. Commissioner, 8th Cir. 1957, 248 F.2d 
869 [52 AFTR 698] (carryback deduc-
tion does not affect computation of fraud 
penalty). We think this conclusion is 
consistent with the language and the 
scheme of the 1939 Code. It validates 
the Tax Court's computation of 1952 
and 1953 fraud penalties. The parties 
recognize that section 6653(d)(1) of the 
1954 Code, which is applicable to the 
1954 fraud penalty, has now explicitly 
provided that only a timely return is to 
be considered in determining the exist-
ence and amount of the underpayment 
which is the measure of the fraud 
penalty. 
£SJ Finally, the Commissioner asks 
us to reverse the Tax Court's holding 
that Martha Cirillo, unlike her husband, 
is not liable for fraud penalties. The 
Commissioner argues that the wife's ac-
tion in joining her husband in filing non-
fraudulent delinquent returns for the 
years in question was sufficient to make 
her too liable for the fraud penalties. 
Earlier cases have decided that a 
wife who is a party to a fraudulent joint 
return may be held liable for the fraud 
penalties assessed on account of her 
husband's fraud in preparing that re-
turn, notwithstanding that she herself 
had no income, did not entertain any 
fraudulent intent, and, indeed, did not 
know that the return was fraudulent. 
Estate of Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 5th 
Cir. 1959, 271 F.2d 511 [4 AFTR 2d 
5761]; Furnish v. Commissioner, 9th 
Cir. 1958, 262 F.2d 727, 731-34 [3 AFTR 
2d 541] ; Kann v. Commissioner, 3d Cir. 
1953, 210 F 2 d 247 [45 AFTR 309], cert 
denied 1954, 347 U.S. 967; Boyett v 
Commissioner. 5th Cir 1953, 204 F.2d 205, 
43 AFTR 915; Howell v. Commissioner, 
6th Cir. 1949, 175 F.2d 240 [38 AFTR 
q 63-4S0 
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G3]; Meyer J. Safra, 195S, 30 T.C. 102G, 
1037. The feature which distinguishes 
the present case from those earlier cases 
and makes it one of first impression is 
that the joint returns here involved were, 
themselves not fraudulent; rather fraud 
occurred and penalties attached earlier 
when the husband, with fraudulent intent, 
failed to file timely returns. 
Whether this distinction warrants a 
different result depends upon the inter-
pretation given to section 51(b) (1 ) of 
the 1939 Code, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 27, as 
amended, 62 StaL 115 (1948) (now Int. 
Rev. Code of 1954. § 6013(d) ( 3 ) ) . which 
provides that where a joint return is 
filed "liability with respect to the tax" 
shall be joint and several. It is reason-
able to view "the tax" for which the 
re turn-signing wife is liable as including 
both the amount stated in the joint re-
turn and any deficiency assessments on 
account of the incorrectness, inadequacy 
or bad faith of that filing. If a wife, 
however innocently, joins in a fraudu-
lent return, any additional assessment 
for fraud is a tax obligation created by 
that filing and measured by the differ-
ence between the tax that should have 
been reported and the amount the 
spouses jointly reported. This rationale 
supports the cited cases involving fraud-
ulent joint returns. 
But in the present case the fraud 
penalty is neither imposed for nor meas-
ured by any deficiency based upon the 
joint return. Indeed, we have already 
pointed out in another connection that 
the deficiency upon which the present 
fraud penalty is based arose when the 
husband, with intent to evade taxes, 
failed to file a t imely return. That de-
ficiency did not subject the wife to any 
liability. Joseph A. Mundy, 1955, 14 
CCH Tax CL Mem., 1067 [« 55,270 P-H 
Memo T C ] . In these circumstances, the 
fraud penalty is in no way dependent 
upon the joint return. For this reason 
it may reasonably be regarded as dis-
tinct from the tax liability which section 
5 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) imposes as a consequence of 
s igning a joint return. Of course, this 
analysis leaves a wife who elects to sign 
a joint return liable for the tax shown 
on the return and any deficiencies which 
may be determined in connection with 
that filing. Neither the language of the 
statute nor any consideration of equity 
or tax policy provides a persuasive rea-
son for imposing a broader liability. 
Accordingly, we agree with the Tax 
v. COMM. 9 1 5 
d 910 (314 F.2d 473) 
Court that Mrs. Cirillo did not become 
liable for fraud penalties. 
So much of the Tax Court's decision 
as imposed fraud penalties for the years 
1945 to 1951, inclusive, will be reversed. 
Otherwise, the decision will be affirmed. 
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DODD DISTRIBUTING COMPANY 
and General Wholesale Company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
U.S., Defendant. 
U.S. District Court, N. Dist. of Ga., At-
lanta Div., Nos. 7540, 7901, Jan. 10. 
1963. 
Years 1956-1957. Decision for Govern-
ment. 
1. B U S I N E S S EXPENSES — Expendi-
tures against public policy—question-
able, unethical or unlawful business 
expenditures. 
Amounts allegedly paid by taxpayer-
companies to a State Revenue Commis-
sioner were not made to influence his 
opinion, judgment, decree or behavior in 
his capacity as Commissioner. Jury ver-
dict. Reference: 1963 P-H Fed. f 11,265. 
2. B U S I N E S S E X P E N S E S — Ordinary 
and necessary. 
Amounts allegedly paid by taxpayer-
companies to a State Revenue Commis-
sioner were not both ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses. Jury verdict. 
Reference: 1963 P-H Fed. f 11.031. '54 
Code Sec. 162(a) . 
James M. Roberts, 610 Fulton Natl. 
Bk. Bldg., Atlanta 3. Ga., Atty for 
Plaintiff. 
Slaton Clemmons, Asst. U.S. Atty., 
P.O. Box 912, Atlanta 1, Ga., for De-
fendant. 
Charge of the Court 
MORGAN, District Judge: 
Members of the Jury, you have been 
sworn as jurors to try the case of Dodd 
Distributing Company and General 
Wholesale Company against the United 
States of America. These are two sepa-
rate and distinct cases, and it will be 
necessary for you to consider and de-
termine each of these cases. They are 
being tried together inasmuch as they 
are factually similar, and it would be 
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INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX ACT OF 1973 59-14A-49 
59-14A-88. Interest on overpayments and refunds. 
59-14 A-89. Additions to tax and ivil penalties. 
59-14A-90. Transferees. 
59-14A-91. Jeopardy assessment. 
59-14A-92. Criminal penalties. 
59-14A-93. Venue of offenses—Evidence. 
59-14A-94. Burden of proof. 
59-14A-95. General powers and duties of the tax commission. 
59-14A-9G. Confidentiality of return information—Penalties—Exchange of in-
formation with Internal Revenue Service or governmental units. 
59-14A-97. Fiscal year taxpayers. 
59-14A-98. Effective date. 
59-14A-47. T a x p a y e r records, s ta tements and special re tu rns . — (a) 
Kvcry person liable for any t ax imposed by this act, or for the collections 
•hereof, shall keep such records, render such s tatements , make such re turns 
.imi comply wi th such rules and regulat ions as the t ax commission may from 
'into to time by regula t ion prescribe. Whenever in the judgmen t of the t ax 
•ninmission it is necessary, it may require any person, by notice served 
•ifKin such person or by regulat ions, to make such re turns , render such 
<t;i<cments, or keep such records, as the tax commission deems sufficient to 
-liow whether or no t such person is liable for t ax under this act. 
(h) The t a x commission may, in its discretion, promulgate regulat ions 
••r instructions t h a t pe rmi t a t axpaye r to submit specified excerpts from his 
federal re turn in lieu of submi t t ing a copy of the entire federal r e tu rn . 
History: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 47. Collateral References. 
Taxation<§=>1079. 
85 C.J-S. Taxation § 1102. 
59-14A-48. Persons requi red to file re turns .—An income tax r e tu rn 
ith respect to the tax imposed by this ac t shall be filed by: 
(a) Every res ident individual , estate or t ru s t required to file a federal 
wonic tax r e tu rn for the taxable y e a r ; 
(1)) Every nonres ident individual , estate or t rus t having federal gross 
iirome derived from sources wi th in the s t a t e for the taxable year and re-
juircd to file a federal income tax re tu rn for such taxable year... 
History: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 48. 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1102. 
Returns, 71 Am. Jur . 2d 850, State and 
Collateral References. , ,m : : i l T;ix:ition §589 ct sen,. 
T:ix:i(ionC=5l079. 
59-14A-49. Re tu rns by husband and wife.—(a) A husband and wife 
:iy make a single r e tu rn jo int ly with respect to the tax imposed by this 
•••levo.ii though one of the spouses has nei ther gross income nor deductions, 
frpt as provided below : 
M) no jo in t re tu rn shall be made if the husband and wife arc not 
•niiill.ed to file a jo in t re turn for federal income tax purposes; 
<_) if the federal income, fax liability of husband or wife is determined 
•n ;i separate re tu rn for federal income tax purposes, the income tax 
alulity of each spouse shall be determined on a separate re turn under 
•'-is net; 
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